Japanese Cultural Nationalism and Globalization in an Asia-Pacific Context by STARRS  Roy
Japanese Cultural Nationalism and
Globalization in an Asia-Pacific Context
著者 STARRS  Roy
会議概要（会議名, 
開催地, 会期, 主催
者等）
Globalization, Localization, and Japanese
Studies in the Asia-Pacific Region : Past,
Present, Future, シドニー大学, 2003年11月10日
-13日
page range 3-18
year 2010-03-19
シリーズ シドニー･シンポジウム 2003 
 International Symposium in Sidney 2003
図書名(英) Globalization, Localization, and Japanese
Studies in the Asia-Pacific Region volume 1
URL http://doi.org/10.15055/00001321
Japanese Cultural Nationalism and Globalization 
 in an Asia-Pacific Context
  Roy STARRs 
University of Otago
    The most vociferous opposition to globalization in Western countries has come from 
the extreme left: anti-globalization riots from Seattle to Genoa have been based on the 
view that mobile global capitalism is making the rich richer and the poor poorer.' We 
have not yet had much violent opposition to globalization from right-wing cultural na-
tionalists-except perhaps in France, where McDonalds restaurants have been attacked 
as symbols of American culinary imperialism. The French, of course, take culture very 
seriously-especially culinary culture. But the general view in the West seems to be that 
globalization is simply another product of the progress of Western civilization, following 
inevitably in the wake of industrialization, capitalism, modernity, postmodernity, and the 
unstoppable advance of science and technology.' Indeed, I suspect that most of us in the 
West perceive globalization as a kind of irresistible historical tsunami: as with the earlier 
Industrial Revolution-of which in many respects it is only the latest phase-it would 
be futile to adopt a "Luddite" stance and try to "stop" it. The most we can hope to do is 
ameliorate its more unfortunate "side-effects"-In particular, the damage it causes to tra-
ditional societies, cultures, and natural environments-while, of course, maximizing its 
benefits (or should we say "profits"?). 
    In Asia the view is somewhat different. Globalization is often seen as a new phase 
of Western, especially Anglo-American, imperialism, threatening a renewal not just of 
economic exploitation but also of cultural domination-as symbolized pre-eminently by 
the globalization of the English language. Since 9/11 we have all been made acutely 
aware of the dangers of an Islamic fundamentalist cum Arab nationalist backlash against 
this perceived threat. But little thought has been given to the possibility of a national-
ist backlash coming from the other side of Asia, from a country that seems so firmly 
implanted within the global capitalist system: Japan. The very idea might seem absurd 
today, but perhaps we should not forget that Japan has a long and powerful tradition of 
both cultural and political nationalism, and that the latter has sometimes erupted into 
various kinds of extremist, anti-democratic action, including terrorism. Furthermore, at
1 This essay attempts to draw some overarching conclusions about Japanese cultural nationalism in the context 
of a globalizing Asia based largely on the research conducted by an international group of Japan and Asia schol-
ars who contributed to three books I have edited in recent years: Asian Nationalism in an Age of Globalization 
(London: Routledge/Curzon, 200 1), Nations Under Siege: Globalization and Nationalism in Asia (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002), and Japanese Cultural Nationalism at Home and in the Asia Pacific (London: Global Oriental, 
2003). 1 thank all of these learned colleagues for their freely shared knowledge, insight, and passion. 
2 For example, a recent best-selling account of globalization that presents this "standard" view of it as unstop-
pable and largely beneficial is New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman's The World Is Flat. See Friedman 
2005.
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certain periods in the island nation's modem history these two forces-the cultural and 
the political-have combined to produce a quite virulent resistance to the "foreign influ-
ence" of Westernization or modernization. As the famous prewar slogan proclaimed: to 
reclaim its native "soul," the Japanese nation had to "overcome modemity."' Even today, 
an arch-traditional, quasi-religious strain of cultural nationalism is prevalent, or at least 
paid lip service to, not just by the lunatic fringe but by some influential sectors of the 
Japanese political elite. In May 2000, for instance, the Prime Minister of the day, Mori 
Yoshir6 AX-A, caused a storm of protest, both domestically and internationally, with his 
declaration before a meetingof lawmakers belonging to the Shint6 Seiji Renmei (Shinto 
Political League) that: "We (have to make efforts to) make the public realize that Japan is 
a divine nation centering on the Emperor. It's been thirty years since we started our activi-
ties based on this thought."' Although some foreign observers may have been genuinely 
shocked by Mori's reactionary, "atavistic," stance, no one who knew Japan or Japanese 
politics well was particularly surprised. Indeed, members of his own party generally did 
not challenge the validity of his remark; they merely regretted its indiscretion as a public 
pronouncement. As the unintentionally revealing excuse offered by the Secretary General 
of the party explained: "the comment was probably a platitude for the religious group."' 
In other words, in the circles in which Mori and his colleagues moved, the belief that "Ja-
pan is a divine nation centering on the Emperor" was merely an accepted truism, so that 
nothing much should be read into the Prime Minister's remark-in the context in which 
it was given, it certainly did not represent any revolutionary departure from the norm. 
This despite the fact that the statement clearly infringed upon the postwar Constitution of 
Japan, which disestablished Shinto as the state religion and placed the people rather than 
the Emperor at the nation's sovereign "center." 
    The Prime Minister, as the Secretary General suggested, may have been merely 
repeating a ritualistic formula to please the ears of his elderly, conservative audience, but 
his statement, even if designed only to curry favor, still shows how closely associated 
Japanese nationalism remains, in the popular mind, with Shinto, the emperor system, 
and even emperor-worship. Although some analysts haVe presented Mori's "gaffe" as yet 
another symptom of Japan's "move to the right" in the late 20'hcentury,' Mori's own com-
ment ("It's been thirty years since we started our activities based on this thought") makes 
it clear that, throughout much of the postwar period, such religio-nationalist sentiments 
were never far from the mainstream of Japanese political life. 
    There are, of course, other examples in Asia of the close association of nationalism 
with religion-Hindu nationalism in India, for instance, or the many different national va-
rieties of Islamic nationalism-but we must also remember that, within the Asian context, 
Japan's historical experience has been somewhat unique. In the past century and a half 
it has suffered-and profited by-two periods when it was reduced to colonial or semi-
colonial status: in the latter half of the I 91h century, the period of extraterritorial treaty
3 See, for instance, Najita and Harootunian 1988, Harootunian 2000, and Hirakawa 2005. 
4 The Japan Times Online, 17 May 2000. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See, for instance, McCormack 2002.
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ports,gunboatdiplomacy,andenfbrcedlowtarif猶;andf士om1945unti11953,theperiod
ofAlliedOccupation,whenGeneralMcArthurruledasthelastshogun.EventodayJapan
cannotbesaidtohavecompletelyoutgrownitssemi-colonialstatusvis-a-vistheUnited
States.Ontheotherhand,duringthehalfcenturyf士oml895tol945,Japanitselfbecame
am勾orcolonialpowerrulingoveravastarcoftheAsia-Pacificregion,andinthelatter
halfofthe20thcenturyitbecameam勾orglobalizingpower,且rstineconomicte㎜sand
nOw,inCreaSingly,inCultUralte㎜StOO.7
Giventhisratherco㎡licted,contradictoryhistory,itisperhapsnotsurprisingthat
Japaneseattitudestowardsglobalizationtendtobeambivalent-nottosayschizophren-
ic-andthat∫apaneseculturalnationalistsoftencamotseemtomakeuptheirminds
whethertheyarevictimsofglobalizationorm勾orglobalizersthemselves.Togiveami-
norexampleofwhatImeanffommyownexperience:IhaveheardaJapanesecolleague
complaininonebreathabouttheglobaldominanceofEnglish,andboastinthenext
breaththat∫apaneseitselfhasbecomeagloballanguage,andisboundtosurpassEnglish
asthefUture"intemationallanguageofbusiness."
NotthatIwouldwishtodownplaytheseriousthreatposedtootherlanguagesby
theglobaldominanceofEnglish.ThedoyenofcomparativeliteratureinJapan,Hirakawa
Sukehiro平 川 祐 弘,haswrittenmovinglyoftheage-olddesireofpoetstoexpressthem-
selvesintheirmothertongue:hearguesthataculturalnationalismcenteredonlanguage
andlitera佩remotivatedthefb㎜ationofanindependentJapanesepoetics,andofan
independentnationalidentitybasedinpartonthatpoetics,asearlyasthebeginningof
thetenthcentury,whenKinoTsurayuki紀貫 之issuedthe``且rstdeclarationofaJapanese
α7ψ06砌 〃～'.8JustasthevemacularEuropeanpoetswoulddeclaretheirindependence.
ofLatinseveralcenturieslater,Tsurayukiproudlydeclaredhisindependenceffo卑the
linguaffancaof:EastAsia,Chinese.AsHirakawawrites:
InthisdefbnseofYamato一厩 α,Japanesepoetry,thenationalJapangsepoetry
wasimplicitlyopposedtoKara一厩 α,Chinesepoetry,whichwasinf乞shionat
theImperialCourtofKyoto.Personsofcultureofthetimeweresupposedto
composepoemsinclassicalChinese.Tsurayuki,however,defbndednational
poetry,because,accordingtohim,italoneisnaturalanddivine。9
Hirakawaseesthisasauniversal,almostinstinctive,andtherefbreinevitableimpulse:
"Myassumptionisthatthereisakindofpsychologicallaw-thatis,thereisacomrnon
attitudesharedbyminoritiestowishtoexpressthemselvesintheirownmothertongue
andthatneedofexpressionisanimportantdrivingfbrceofnationalism."10
Given,then,thatlanguageandliteraturehavesooftenbeenmadeasiteofstrenuous
contentionbyculturalnationalistsseekingtoasserttheirindependenceffommorepower-
fUl,globalizingcivilizations,Hirakawapredictsthattheglobaldominanceofthepresent-
daylingua丘anca,English,willinevitablyprovokenewexpressionsoflanguage-based
7ForperceptiveanalysesofJapan'sgrowingroleasanintemationalculturalpower,especiallyinAsia,see
S6derbergandReader2000.
8Hirakawa2004,p.27.
91bid.,p.28.
101bid.,p.27.
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culturalnationalismin21st-century∫apanandelsewhere.ll
AmorerecentexampleofJapaneseresistancetofbreignlinguisticdominationoc-
curredduringthepostwarOccupationperiod,inresponsetothealmosthare-brained
schemefbr``languagerefbrm"concoctedbyoneRobertKingHall,anofHcialofthe
EducationDivisionoftheoccupyingauthorities.Hallwasconvincedthatasubstitution
oftheRomanalphabetfbrthetraditionalJapanesewritingsystem,acomp!exmixtureof
Chinesecharactersandnativesyllabary,wouldhelp"democratise"Japan.12Sincelan-
guageplayssuchacrucialrolebothasamediumandasano切ectofnationalistsentiment,
thisschemeseemedtothreatentheverycoreofJapan'snationalidentity.AsHarryWray
writes:"BecauseofthelackofaclearSCAPpolicystatement,theJapaneseGovemment
andmostpeoplefbaredthelossoftheirwrittenlanguageandlinkwiththeirancestors,and
historicalandliterarypast."13Hallpursuedtheschemewithalltheblinkeredzealofhis
missionaryancestors,andWray'saccountofthepersonalityclashesinvolvedreadslike
afirst-ratepsychologicalnovel.Coolerheadsprevailedintheend,whichwasfbrtunate
because,asWraypointsout,the"re飴㎜wouldhavebomesevererepercussionsaf飴cting
otherOccupationre鉛㎜sbecausemoderatesandliberalswouldhavebeendeeplyalien-
atedbytheabolitionofkarU●i.Po6t-OccupationJapanese-Americanrelationsalsowould
havebeenaf琵cted."14Nevertheless,themodestsimplificationsofthewrittenlanguage
whichwereenactedunderOccupationpressurestillanger``conservativescholarsand
nationalists."Indeed,writerswhowereculturalnationalists,includingsuchm句orfigures
asTanizaki谷崎 潤 一 郎,Kawabata川 端 康 成andMishima三 島 由 紀 夫,ignoredthese"re-
fb㎜s"andcontinuedtousethetraditionalwritingsystemuntiltheendoftheircareers.
AsthesetwoexamplesgivenbyHirakawaandWraymakeclear,thestrengthand
longevityofJapaneseculturalnationalismareafUnctionnotjustofdomesticneedbut
alsooffbreignpressure:Japan'sselfLperceptionasanislandnationcontinuallyunder
siegefヒommuchlargerandmorepowerfUlcivilizationsnodoubtaccountsfbrtheexag-
geratedemphasisonitsculturaluniquenessthatappearsinnationalistwritingssinceat
leastthe18thcentury.Itisobviouslyaself=defbnsivemechanismofatypethatlarger
civiliz訂tions,withtheireasyconfidenceintheirownsuperiority,fbelnoneedfbr。The
problemarises,however,whenJapantriestostepf士ombeinganisolatedislandnation
withakindofsiegementalityintobeinganexpansivecolonialorglobalizingpoweL
IthinkitisinstructivetocompareJapanwiththeUnitedStatesonthispoint.One
ofthegreatstrengthsofAmericanculturalnationalismhasbeenitseasy,unquestioning
assumptionofuniversality-aheritageofthelate18thcentury,theageoftheEnlighten-
mentandoftheFrenchandAmericanRevolutions.Indeed,thisassumptionoftentakes
onaquasi-religious,Messianicquality:theglobalizationofAmericanculturalvalues,of
the``Americanwayoflifb,"ispresentedasthebesthopefbrtheliberation,prosperity
andhapPinessofallhumanity.TherecentconquestsofAfghanistanandIraqwerejusti一
且edquiteblatantlyinthesete㎜snotonlybytheWashingtonpoliticalestablishmentbut
111bid.,p.34.
12Wray2001,p.258.
131bid.,p.253.
141bid.,p.254.
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also,moresurprisingly,byavastconsensusamongadisturbinglyuncriticalAmerican
media.Indeed,itseemsthatthisviewoftheuniversalvalidityandapplicabilityofAmeri-
canculturalvaluesissodeeplyentrenchedinAmericanculturethatveryfbwAmericans
recognizeitasafb㎜ofculturalnationalism.ButevenifoneconsidersthisAmerican
world-viewtobenaTveorarrogant-asmanynon-AmericansandevensomeAmericans
do-onemustadmitthatitcarriesacertainpotency-somethingofthepotencyofaself=
fUl且llingprophecy-inthisparticularhistoricalmomentwhentheU.S.stridestheglobe
asthesolesuperpowerandthem司.ordrivingfbrceofglobalization.
Incontrast,theexclusivityoftheJapaneseculturalnationalists,theirconstantharp-
ingontheirownuniqueness,wouldseemtohandicaporbedevilanyattempttoglobalize
∫apaneseρulturetoanextentthatwouldbecommensuratewithJapan'spositionasthe
world'ssecondlargesteconomicpower.CertainlyJapaneseculturehasnotyetbeenglo-
balizedassuccessfUllyasitsAmericancounterpart,despitethebesteffbrtsofagencies
suchastheJapanFoundation.Andyetthefactremainsthatitis.increasinglybeingglo-
balized-sushishopsarebecomingascommonashamburgerjointsinmanypartsofthe
world,and,tomakeanalmo3trandomlist,Japanesemanga(comics),anime(cartoons),
karaoke,judo,karate,sumo,bonsai,hai㎞,popmusicstarsandpopnovelistssuchasMu-
rakamiHaruki村 上 春 樹andY6shimoto .Banana吉 本 ば な なarebecomihgincreasingly
popularinAsiaandthroughouttheworld.Ofcourse,thisoffbrsfhrtherproof;ifanywere
needed,thattheJapaneseculturalnationalistclaimtoabsoluteuniquenessandexclusivity
isbasedentirelyonmyth.Butthemoreinterestingpointisthatitisthisverymythical,
self=contradictoryviewofJapaneseculturethathasitselfbeensuccessfUllyglobalized:
througheverythingfセomthewriterKawabataYasunari'sNobeltalkofl968tothelatest
JapanesecompanypropagandabookletsandevenJapaneselanguagetextbooks.
AsK6sakuY6shino吉 野 耕 作hasmadeclearinhisstudyoftheplethoraofpopular
handbooksandmanualsonintemLationalculturaldif琵rencesappearinginJapantoday,it
seemsthat,themoreJapanispressuredtointeractwiththeoutsideworld,themoreits
nationalistideologuesstresstheislandnation'suniquenessandevensuperiority.151roni-
cally,thesepublications,whichareoftensponsoredbylargecorporationssuchasNip-
ponSteelandMitsubishi,areostensiblymeanttoencourageinternationalfヒiendshipand
understanding.But,byreiteratingallthehoaryoldclich6sandstereotypesaboutEast/
Westculturaldif飴rencesandJapaneseuniqueness,theyreinfbrceculturalnationalismin
itsmostreactionary鉤㎜:thesensethat"Japan"is,inessence,aseparate,altemativeand
somehowsuperiorcivilization,especiallyvis-a-vistheW6st.Presentedinthiswayaspart
ofalaudablepr(オectof"intemationalization,"nationalismisinfactmademorepalatable
tothepostwar``liberal"generation:as梅shinowrites,it``appealstothoseincontempo-
raryJapanesesocietywhohavenotcompletelyrq●ectednationalismbutwishtoavoida
retum.tothepre-wartypeofnationalism."16Thus``discoursesofculturaldif琵rences,"
producedbynationalistacademicwritersofハ勒oη10珈o刀,are```reproduced'andpopular-
izedincross-culturalmanualsfbrthe`consumption'ofthoseconcernedwithintercultural
communication_.thisprocessservestoincreasesensitivitytoculturaldif飴rencesbe一
15Ybshino2001,pp.19-33.
161bid.,p.22.
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tweennations,therebyenhancingasenseofculturalnationalism"17
1nthisrespect,eventhecurrentJapanesef乞dof"intemationalization"isusedto
fbsternationalism-surelyanothersignoftheextraordinarystrengthanddurabilityof
nationalisminJapan.Butthisnationalismhasalsofbltitselftobeunderthreatoflate,
mainlybecauseofthemorethandecade-16nghangoverJapanhassuf陀redsincetheboom
yearsofthe1980s.ThisiswhatGavanMcCo㎜ackaptlyte㎜sit吻伽12c1εmalaise.18
McCo㎜ackpointstoaseriesofphenomenawhichemergedinthepost-ColdWarperiod
assymptomsofthecontradictionsinherentinthepost-SecondWorldWarJapanesepol-
ity:``Theedificeofthepost-warJapanesestatewaserectedoveraseriesofunresolved
contradictiolls:betweenthepastofimperialmilitarismandfascism.andthepresentof
popularsovereigntyandpaci丘sm;between飴㎜alnationalsovereigntyontheonehand
andthecircumstancesofocqupationinwhichthepostwarstatewasbomandthecom-
plexofwaysinwhichasemi-dependentorientationtowardstheUnit6dStatesbecame
entrenchedsincethenontheother;betweenthetheoryoftheworldりsmostdemocratic
constitutionandthepracticeofhighlyconcentratedbureaucraticpower."19
Theresultantsenseofdislocationandtheperceivedthreattonationalidentityhas
resultedsofarnotinanyseriousattempttoresolvethecontradictionsbutinavague
``nostalgiafbrastrongJapan"whichhasled
,inturn,toaspreadofright-wingnationalism
evenamongthe"liberal"middleandprofbssionalclasses.200nerecentmanifbstationof
thishasbeenthecampaignstorevisehistorytextbookssothattheywill"inculcateasense
ofprideinthehistoryofournation."21Asatypicalrepresentativeofthis```liberal'wing
ofneo-nationalism,"McCo㎜ackof飴rsTokyoUniversityPro飴ssorF両iokaNobukatsu
藤 岡 信 勝:
CertainqualitiesinF切'ioka'swritingsandactionsseemtobewidelyshared
byhisgeneration:anignoranceofandlackofinterestinhistory(saveasa
tellingofthenational`story');afbelingofhumiliationattheconstanthaq)一
ingonJapan'ssupposedwarcrimesanddarkhistory;angeratthe`diplomacy
ofapology'conductedbyspokesmenfbrtheJapanesegovernment;andirrita-
tiOnattheIOWpOStUreCOnStantlyreqU.iredbyJapan'SinCOrpOratiOnWithinthe
UnitedStatessphere,underitsumbrella,andsu切ectedtoregulardosesofits
condescensionandbashing.DistasteorantipathytowardstheUnitedStatesis
combinedwithemotionalattachmenttoavague鉛㎜ofpure`Japaneseness,'
bothofwhichsentimentsarewrappedinadeepanxietyovertheconfUsionsof
latemodernity.22
Inotherwords,thesemovementsseektodefbndJapanagainstglobalizationbyre-
storingits"Japaneseness"一whichmeans,inparticular,arestorationoftheEmperorto
hisprewarpositionofcentralityandsovereigntyandarestorationalsoofproperrespect
171bid.,p.21.
18McCo㎜ack2002,p.137.
191bid,,p.139.
201bid.,p.144.
21Quotedinibid.,P.143.
221bid.,p.144.
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fbrsuchnationalsymbolsasthe且ag,theanthemandthemilitary.Whatisalsohighlysig-
nificantisthat:``lncreasingly,`Japaneseness'isdefined,asitwasinthe1930s,byopposi-
tiontoAsia."230fcourse,thisisallveryfamiliar:right-wingactivistshavebeencalling
fbrsucha"restoration"fbrdecades.But,asMcCo㎜ackpointsout:``Theseconceptions
ofJapanesenessmightbere飴rredtoas`rightist'andtraditional.Whatisinterestingin
thel990sisthattheybegantoconvergewithotherstreamsofthoughtsharedbymany
progressiveandliberalintellectuals."24And,ofcourse,whatthisimpliesisthatthenew
nationalismislikelytobefarrnore.widelyinHuentialthanwasitsoldervariety,which
wasco㎡inedtoextremistffingegroups.Infhct,itisprobablyfbrthisreasonthatthere
hasbeenlittlepopularprotestagainsttheJapanesegovernment'sincreasinglynationalis-
ticpoliciesaschronicledbyMcCo㎜ack.Indeed,in2001asuΦrisingnewphenomenon
appearedinJap㊧nesepolitics,anewprimeminister,KoizumiJun'ichir6小泉 純 一 郎,who
erOoyedanalmostrock-starpopularity,instarkcontrasttohisveryunpopularpredeces-
sorMoriYbshir6-eventhough,likeMori,hewasareactionarynationalistinthemost
traditionalLDPmold.ItseemedasifmuchoftheJapanesepublicbelievedthattheyhad
且nallybundthe"strongman"whowouldpulltheircountryoutofitsdoldrums.Inte㎜s
ofinternationalrelations,however,hisregimequicklyrallintotrouble,whentheChinese
andKoreansexpressedoutrageandthreatenedretaliationovernewJapanesegovernment-
approvedhistorytextbooksthat"whitewashed"Japan'swartirnerecordofatrocitiescom-
mittedonthecontinent.
Thus,asMcCo㎜ackpointsout:``itishardtoresisttheconclusionthattheproblems
remainunresolvedinJapanasthenewcenturybegins,andthatthemeasuresbeingadopt-
edtoaddressthemarebothrevanchist,inthesenseofuncriticallyrevivingthefb㎜ulas
oftheearlier,imperialJapanesestate,andcontradictory,inthesenseoffUsingdependent
statusinintemationalaf魚irswithreassertionofthesymbolsandmythsofaproud,pure,
autonomousJapan."25
0fcourse,theJapaneseobsessionwithwhatis``purelyJapanese"isechoedthrough-
outAsiabyvariousfb㎜sofpuristoressentialistnationalismwhichcanbecomepa貰icu-
larlydangerousincountriesmoreethnicallydiversethanJapan,suchasthecountriesof
southandsoutheastAsia.HereethnicminoritiessuchastheChineseareoftenperceived
astheinsidiousagentsofglobalization,enrichingthemselvesattheexpenseofindig-
enouspopulationsandposingathreatbytheirverypresencetotheethnicandcultural
basesofnationalidentity,Intimesofeconomiccrisis,such"visibleminorities"caneasily
becomescapegoats,oftenattheinstigationofcomlptandunscrupulousgovernmentstry-
ingtodeflectblameawayfヒomthemselves.ThisisexactlywhathappenedinIndonesiain
l997-98,fbrinstance,whentheeconomiccrisiswasaccompaniedbyanti-Chineseriots.
Withitsgreaterwealthanditshighdegreeofethnichomogeneity,Japanwouldseem
tobeinafarmoresecureposition,andonemightwonderwhetheritisnowpreparingfbr
anewperiodofanti-fbreignismand"nationalisolation."Certainlytherearemanyhistori-
calprecedentstosupportthissupposition:afモeraperiodofopeningtothe``outsideworld"
231bid。,p.154.
241bid.,p.145.
251bid.,p.161.
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andabsorbingwhatitwantedffomfbreigncultures,theislandnationwouldoftenclose
clam-tightasifbyakindofnationalself=protectiveinstinct.Butisthisstillpossibleinthe
high-techworldthatJapanitselfhashelpedtocreate?Evenifitsownculturaltraditions
ornationalsurvivalinstinctsarenowurgingittowardsaperiodofisolation,isnational
isolationaviableoptioninthisinterconnectedandincreasinglyglobalizedworld?As
ArvindDashaspointedout,thereareno``inside"and``outside"worldsinthisagewhen
theinternet丘eelycrossesnationalborders.26
AndsowecomebackagaintotheinescapablefactthatJapaneseculturefacesthe
prospectofbeingincreasinglyglobalized.Thiscanhappen,ofcourse,intwoways:either
Japanesecultureitselfisspreadaroundtheworldoritisopeneduptoincominginterna-
tionali㎡luencesathome;inotherwords,eitheritbecomesaglobalculturalfbrceitselfor
itistrans飴 ㎜edbyglobalculturalinHuences.W6mightcallthesetheactiveandpassive
polesofglobali2ation.
Inthiscontext,Japaneseculturalnationalistsfindthemselvescaughtinakindof
paradoxicaldoublebind:ifJapanesecultureisglobalizedineithertheactiveorthepas-
sivesense,itwillbe``hybridized"andthusstandindangeroflosingwhattheyseeas
itsuniqueessence,itsquintessentiallyJapanesecharacterOntheotherhand,ifitisnot
globalized,especiallyintheactivesenseofbeingspreadglobally,itstandsindangerof
beingfbreverregardedasarelativelypowerlessandperipheralculture.Afterall,m勾or
worldpowerssinceancienttimeshavealltriedtospreadorglobalizetheirculturestothe
maximumgeographicalextentoftheirimperialexpansion:culturalpowerwasalwaysa
naturalconcomitantofmilitaryandeconomicpoweLAnynationthatwishestobecome
animperialorglobalpowerneedstodevelopsomesortofuniversalisticideologybased
OnitSOWnCUlturalValueS.
DuringJapan'smodernimperialistperiod-roughly,thehalfcenturybetweenthe
Sino-Japanese鴨rofl895andtheendofthePaci五c丶Varin1945-Japanesenational-
istssolvedthisproblemintwoways:ontheonehand ,byadoptingastraightfbrward
W6stern-styleracist/imperialistideologyand,ontheotherhand,bypreachingthemore
high-mindeddoctrineofpan-Asianism(and,ofcourse,thesetwo"ideologies"werenot
mutuallyexclusiveinpractice).Oneofthemostauthoritativecontemporarywriterson
pan-Asianism,PaserjitDuara,haspointedou.tthatthosewhochallengedtheEurocentric
EnlightenmentidealofauniversalCivilization,seenbymanyasajustificationfbrW6st-
emimperialism,withanalternativeidealofpan-Asiancivilization,weregivenasigni且一
cantboostbyglobalreactionsagainstthehorrorsoftheFirstWorldWar:"Writera食er
writerdenouncedthematerialismanddestructivenessofWesternCiviIization."27Since
thewarwasaverybadadvertisementfbrthegloriesandadvantagesofW6stemciviliza-
tion,andespeciallyfbritsboastofbeingtheengineofhumanprogress,Her4er'snotion
ofthevalueofindividuallydif艶rent,locally-rootedculturesseemedtomakesenseagain
,
and,ironicallyinviewofGe㎜any's"de角at,""theGe㎜anicnotionof漁 〃〃7gaineda
signi且cantvictoryoverthenotionofauniversalCivilizationwhichmeasuredvalueonly
26Das2002,p.44.
27Duara2002,p,69.
JapaneseCulturalNationalismandGlobalizationinanAsia-PacificContext11
accordingtocertainVい∋sternstandardsofprogress."28
Atthesametime,thepost-WorldWarOneperiodwitnessedthe"且naltriumphof
nationalismornationalselfdete㎜inationoverimperialismasthehegemonicglobalide-
ology"(bestrepresentedbyWoodrowWilson'sdoctrineofnationalselfdete㎜ination).29
ButDuaraarguesthatnationalismneverappearedtosufacebyitsel茸italwaysseemed
toneedreinfbrcementbyacivilizationalideologythatwouldgivenationstatesasense
of``transcendentsplritualpurpose."30Civilizationbecamethe"highlyself=consciouside-
ologyofthenation,"givingitan``exaltedandnoblevision"ofitself31Thusnationsall
overtheworldtold``theirhistoriesinthesameIinearmodeofemergentnationalsu厨ects
lir虹kedtoclassicalcivilizations."321nthecaseofAsiannations,theparadoxwasthat,in
thusassertingtheirindependencefヒomtheW6st,theywereusingwhatwasessentially
aW6sternideaofcivilization:"itisimportanttorecognizethatthenewdiscourseof
civilization-especiallyEastemcivilization-wasaf且㎜edinthe鴨stbefbreitwascon一
且㎜edinAsia.Inthissensetoo,civilizationremainsapostcolonialconcept."33
ThiscanbeseenmostclearlyinthecaseofJapan,byfarthemostsuccessfUlpracti-
tionerofthisfbmofcivilizationalone-upmanship:"thereareseveralnaπativestrategies
withinthehistoriographyofnationsthatcanbedeployedtopositionanationasthetrue
representativeortheleaderof(ifnotequivalentto)acertaincivilizationaltradition.The
mostpower血lofthese-atleastinte㎜sofitsimpactonthedomesticpopulation-was
theJapaneseclaimofinheritingtheleadershipofAsiancivilizationbecauseofitssuccess
inmasteringW6sternCivilization_."34TheJapanesenotionofanalternativeciviliza-
tionwascenteredontheconceptofAsia,aconcepttheJapanesehadinheritedffomthe
Europeansinthenineteenthcentury.Duaraillustratesthisprocesswellwiththeexarnple
ofOkakuraTenshin岡 倉 天 心,whowasamongthefirstbilingualandbiculturalthir〔kers
inMe茸iJapan.HisconstructionofanaltemativeAsiancivilization"entailedadeepfa-
miliaritywithEuropeanmodesofconstmctingtheideaofacivilization."35ForhimAsian
civilizationdiffbredffomaggressiveW6stem.civilizationbyvirtueofits``promotionof
peaceandbeauty."36A且erJapan'svictoryintheRusso-JapaneseWaritbecameacom-
monpIacethatJapanshouldleadAsiabecauseitha㎜onizedthebestofAsiancivilization
withW6sterncivilization.But,Duaracautions,Japanesepan-Asianideologycannotbe
entirelydismissedasmeredisguisedimperialism,andhegivessomeexamplesofsincere
pan-Asianistswho.triedtoestablishmulti-Asianutopiasonthecontinent.Itisalsoa
significantfactthatJapanesecivilizationaldiscourseandpan-Asianideologyhadacon-
siderableinnuenceontherestofAsia-including,ironically,onitsfb㎜ercivilizational
mentor,China.AlthoughpointsofviewregardingEasternversusW6stemcivilization
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werevariousamongChineseintellectuals,allsharedthebasicassumptionthat"thedif=
色rencesbetweenEastandWestwerecivilizationaldiffbrences,andthatsuchdif驚rences
positedholistic,isolatedand`pure'civilizations."37
AlthoughAsiannationshavebeenabletousecivilizationaldiscourseinthiswayto
servetheirownends,Duaraalsopointsoutthat,sincecivilizationultimatelytranscends
nation,itcanbeadouble-edgedsword:``Thetranscendentstanceofcivilization...may
pe㎜itacritiqueofthenationand_canproducetheproblemofloyaltiesdividedbetween
thosetothenationandtocivilization"(afactignoredbyrecentscholarssuchasSamuel
Huntington,whoattempttoconHatenationandcivilization).38Withincivilizationaldis-
courseitselfthereisalsoaconHictbetweenthenationalistimpulsetoconflatecivilization
withnationalterritoryandthe"spiritual"(andmorepopularsocial)impulsetoviewcivi-
Iizationtransnationallyoruniversally.Agoodexampleoftheconflictswhichcanresult
isprovidedbypopular``redemptive"religioussectssuchastheFalungong,andbythe
oppressiveresponsetothembytheChinesestate.Indeed,Duara五ndsthatsuchpopulist
movementsincurthedispleasurenotonlyofnationalgovernmentsbutalsoofnational
intellectualestablishments,historiansincluded:modernnationalisthistoriographyラs"re-
pugnancetowardssocialmovementsthatre釦setoac㎞owledgeallegiancetothenation
state"hasmeantthatsuchmassmovements,basedoncivilizationaldiscourse,havebeen
ignored.39
1nChinaparticularly,thereputationofredemptivesectsamongnationalistswasnot
helpedbytheirapparentoccasionalcollaborationwiththeinvadingJapanese,whosought
``toappropriatetheiruniversalisma
ndconvertitintoamoreexclusiveideologyofEastern
civilization."401ntheJapapesepuppetstateofManchukuoandlaterinnorthChinamany
ofthesesocietiesbecamerecognizedbythegove:mmentas"educationalorganiza‡ions"
whosepurposewastoinstilabeliefin``pan-Asianvalues."Toleratedinthiswaybythe
Japanese,suchsocietieswereperceivedbytheircompatriotsascollaboratorswiththe
fbreignimperialistsandasopponentsoftheirowncountrymen,thenationalists(KMT)
andthecommunists(CCP).Nevertheless,DuaraposesthedifHcultmoralquestion:``how
魚rcanweholdapeopleresponsiblefbrthestate'smanipulationoftheirideals?"41
But,toretum[toJapanitself;howdidnationalistthinkerstherereconciletheirown
culturalnationalismwiththeideologyofpan-Asianism,particularlyvis-a-visChina,the
neighboringcountrythathasalwaysloomedlargestinJapanesenationalistthought?Of
course,therecanbenoculturalnationalismwithouta"signi且cantother"R)rcomparison
andcontrast,butof㌃enthat``other"islittlemorethanadistantabstraction,perhapseven
aconvenientlyabsentwhippingboy,asChinawastothe18thcenturyJapanesenativists.
OnceJapanembarkeduponitsimperialistadventuresontheAsiancontinentinthelate
lgthcentury,however,Chinaturnedfヒombeingadistantabstractionintoanimmediate
andurgentproblem,aproblemthat,ifnotcorrectlysolved,couldendangerJapan'sown
371bid.,p。81.
381bid.,p.72.
391bid,,p.84.
401bid.,p.90.
411bid.,p.93.
JapaneseCulturalNationalismandGlobalizationinanAsia-PacificContext13
very釦Ulre.AsJung-SunHanhassuccinctlyputit:"themodernJapanesetransfb㎜ation
wasmadeofboth`nation-building'and`empire-building'processes,whichweremutual-
lyconstitutive,sometimesconHictingandsometimescomplementingeachotheL"42Thus
thequestionofJapan'sproperrelationwithChinainparticular,inculturalasmuchasin
economicorpoliticalte㎜s,becameam司.orpreoccupation鉛rmanyJapanesenationalist
thinkers,andinevitablyhadashapinginfluenceontheirownculturalnationalism
The且rstpointthatshouldbemade-especially,onefbels,fbranEnglish-speaking
readership-isthatthemodemhistoryofJapan'srelationswithitsAsia-Pacificneighbors
hasnotbeenirrelievablyunpleasantorantagonistic.Therehavebeenpositiveaswell
asnegativeaspectstothisrelationship,andnotonlyinitspost-WorldWarTwophase.
Aboveall,theMe茆Japanthattrans魚㎜editselfintoanindependentandpowerfUInation
state,andthepost-WorldWarTwoJapanthatroseffomtheashestobecomeaneconomic
superpower,bothservedintheirtimeasaninspiringrole-modelfbrotherAsiannations.
AndthereismorethanadashofuncomfbrtabletnlthintheJapanesenationalists'con-
tinuingclaimthatimperialJapanhelpedffeeAsiaf士omtheimperial鴨st.Inpresent-day
India,fbrinstance,SubhasChandraBose,leaderoftheanti-R句``lndianNationalA㎜y"
underdirectJapanesepatronageandcontrol,isnowwidelyregardedasanationalhero,
althoughtheBritishstilltendtoseehimasape面dioustraitorFu曲e㎜ore,asKenHen-
ShallhaSpOintedOUtinhiSStU.dyOftheJapaneSerUleOfMiCrOneSia,eVenJ耳paneSeCOIO-
nialismwasnotalwaysheavy-handedanditcouldsometimesyieldrealbene且tsfbrthe
localpopulation.Indeed,HenshalmndsthattheMicronesians魚redratherbetterunder
theJapanesethantheyhaddoneundertheSpanishorGe㎜ans,notonlyeconomically
butalsointe㎜softhehealthandeducationservicesprovidedfbrthem.Thus,whenwar
cameinthel930s,"notafbwislanderswillinglyvolunteeredtojointheJapanesefbrces"
andeven``petitionedtobealIowedtofightfbrtheempqror"43Thiswasatleastonecase,
then,whentheJapanesenationalistrhetoricabouthelping``culturallylessadvanced"peo-
plesseemedtohavesomebasisinreality。
Norcanwediscountthesigni且cantculturalinHuencethatmodemJapanhashad,
especiallyonitsEastAsianneighbors(thosewhobelongtotheoldSinocentric,`℃onfU-
cian"culturalsphere).JapanesescholarshiponChina,fbrinstance,hasplayedam司'or
roleinadvancingthemodemscienti且cstudyofChinesehistoryandcivilization,evenin
ChinaitselfAsAida-YUenWonghasshown,pioneeringJapanesewOrkinDunhuangol-
ogy('o訛 δg盈 〃 敦 煌 学)一thatis,thestudyofthetreasuretroveofancientmanuscripts
andartefactsfbundatDunhuangandotherSilkRoadsites-atKyotoImperialUniversity
丘omthel910stothel.930s,withitsnovelapproachcharacterizedbymultidisciplinary
andmulticulturalscholarship,significantly"impactedonthedevelopmentofChinese
scholarship."44
Nonetheless,tomovenowtothenegativesideofthemodemJapaneserelationship
withChina,Wongalso且ndsthatthisscholarshipwasblemishedbythe飴ctthat"thesub-
jectsofinquiryandtheib㎜ulationsofproblembetrayedanideologicalpositionthatwas
42Han2004,p.231.
43Henshall2004,p.245.
44Wong2004,p.253.
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nationalistic."451nparticular,theKyotoImperialUniversityscholarsweremotivatedbya
desiretounde㎜inenotonlyEurocentrismbut,mores呻risingly,Sinocentrism.Thatis,
theysoughttousetheevidenceoftheirSilkRoadfindingstoshowthatChinawasnotthe
single,great,hegemoniccivilizationofEastAsiabutapolyglotmixtureofmanycultures,
someofCentralAsianorevenWestAsianorigin.This"multiculturalreadingof.Chinese
history"waschampioned,fbrinstance,byHanedaT6ru羽田 亨,who"positedthatbefbre
BuddhismtookrootinChina,ithadalreadybeenhighlydevelopedinmanypartsofthe
SilkRoad.ThisdisturbedthetraditionalbeliefthatChinawasthemostprogressivecul-
tureinitssphereofinfluence."461nthusdownplayingthehighculturalachievementsof
theChinese,ofcourse,theKyotoscholarswere,atsomelevel,tryingtomakethemyth
ofJapan's"civilizingmission"inChinaseemlessimplausible.
TheabsurdideaoftheChineseasnotonlyculturallybutraciallyinfbriortothe
Japanesehaditsorigins,asRumiSakamotohasshown,inthesocialDarwinistracial
stereotypesthattheMe茸iJapaneseinheritedf士omthehighageofVictorianimperialism.47
Forinstance,althoughtheleadingMe垣intellectualNitobeInaz6's新渡 戸 稲 造negative
attitudetoChina,asdescribedbyGeorgeOshiro,compromisedhisreputationasaliberal
Christianhumanitarianandinternational``bridge-builder,"tragicallymarringtheendof
alonganddistinguishedcareer,inthisrespectNitobewas,unfbrtunately,atypical``man
ofMe茆,"withanunshakablebeliefinthe"natural"hierarchyofracesandcultures.48As
Sakamotosuccinctlyputsit:
ThenegativerepresentationofChinaandtheChineseinthediscourseofthe
JapaneseEnlighte㎜entresulted.丘omtheMe巧ielites'attempttoresistthe
Orientalist-racistgazeoftheV晦stbyconstructingasu切ectpositionofthe
`Japaneserace'asadistinctcategoryffomthe℃hi
neserace.'...theJapanese
constnlctionofthe℃hineserace'asJapan'sihfbriorOthermustbeunderstood
inrelationtotheW6stemrepresentationofthe`yellowrace'(includingJapan)
astheuncivilisedOtheroftheV昭∋st.49
And,ofcourse,asintheW6st,thisracistideologyprovidedaconvenientjustificationfbr
acolonialtakeoverofthe``uncivilizedOtheL"
W6canseetheothersid60fMe類isocialDarwinisminthethoughtofthejournalist
andgeographypro艶ssor,ShigaShigetaka志賀 重 昂:itstendencytoidealizetheWest.
JustassomeJapaneselookeddownontheirfbllowAsians,helookeduptothe"Anglo-
Saxonrace,"admiringinparticularthesupposed``socialutopia"theyhadrecentlycreated
intheantipodes.Inhisbest-sellingbookdescribinghis1886visittotheSouthPaci且c,he
singledoutNewZealandespecially,inMasakoGavin'swords,"asaparagon,an`Anglo-
Saxonmiracle,'whoseeconomicandsocialachievementprovidedanidealmodelfbra
newJapan."50ButhismeetingwithaMaorichiefseemedtoteachhimanotherDarwin一
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ianlessonalongthelinesofthe``survivalofthefittest":insubmittingtoBritishruleand
beingoverawedbyBritishpowミr,theMaorihadlosttheirownculturalautonomyand
theirculturehadbeguntodie.Thus,fbrJapanitself;Shigabegantoadvocatehiswidely
inHuentialdoctrineofんoん 〃5〃'5伽g'国 粋 主 義(maintenanceofnationalculturalidentity).
But,asIt6Y亘shi伊 藤 雄 志hasnoted,Japaneseimperialismwasnotmotivatedsole-
lybysocialDarwinismorracistideology;althoughtheseprovidedsomeputativejusti-
fication,therewerealsomorepracticalf乞ctorsencouragingJapan's``expallsion"tothe
Asianmainland:``ThecolonizationofAsiancountriesprovidedameansfbrdealingwith
domesticoverpopulationandabreakwateragainsttheterritorialexpansionofWεstem.
powers.ItwasunderthesecircumstancesthatJapanesenationalistsemphasizedJapan's
roleandprosperityinAsia."51
1nhisanalysisofthethoughtoftwoleading``nationalist"writersoftheearly20th
century,Yam句iAizan山路 愛 山andNait6Konan内 藤i湖 南,however,It6findsthat
therearecrucialdif飴rencesbetweentheirpositionsonChina,andthattherefbre``the
word`nationalist'istoosimplistictoencompassthefUllcomplexityofMeUiandTaish6
thought."52Whereas,fbrinstance,Nait6consideredtheChineseincapableofgoverning
themselvesand``eventuallycametosupportaJapaneseimperialistinvasionofChina,"
Yam句iadvocatedastrong,independentChinathatwouldallyitselfwithJapan``inthe
mutualinterestofmaintainingtheirnationalindependenceffomWεstempowers."53To
providefUrthergroundsfbrthis``naturalalliance"betweenthetwoEastAsiannations,
Yam句ialsor(訂ectedtheSinophobiaofmanyofhiscontemporariesandemphasizedthe
racialandculturaltiesbetweenthetwopeoples.
Belieying,however,thatChinainitspresentanarchicstateneededastrongcentral
gove㎜entinorderto"createasecondJapanintheFarEast,"%m句idescriedthe齟u-
enceof鴨stemizedJapaneseeducatorsinChina:``AftertheRevolutioninlgI1,Chinese
democratsestablished`anextremelydemocraticconstitution'onthebasisofthe`super-
ficial'theoryofconstitutiontheyIearned丘omJapaneselecturersandthe`impractical'
theorytheyweretaughtbyJapaneseexpertsonChina,inordertomakethenewPresident
YUanShinkaipowerless."541naneerieanticipationoftherecentdebatessurroundingthe
W6steminterventionsinAfghanistanandIraq,Yam句iarguedthat:"Becausetherewere
variousdialects,fbelings,andcustomsinChina,itwasimpossibletocreateonesolidna-
tionallifbbymeansofdemocraticpolitics."551nshort,Yam勾iwasaveryinterestingearly
voiceinthelong-ru㎜ingdebate(morethaiacenturyoldandstillgoingstrong)about
whetherdemocracyisauniqueproductofW6sterncultureand,ifso,whetheritiscultur-
allysuitablefbrAsia.AlthoughopposingtheimpositionofaW6stem-styledemocracy,
heinsistedthattherewasanindigenousfb㎜withitsrootsinConfUcianthought.Alsohe
sawtheancientChinesecitystatesasplayingthesameroleastheirGreekcounteq)arts
inprecipitatingtheearliest鉛㎜sofdemocracγGiventhe釦llcomplexi呼andsobhisti一
511to2004,P.213,
521bid.,p.214.
531bid.,p.216.
541bid.,p.219.
551bid.,PP.219-220.
16 Roy STARRs
cation of Yamaji's thought, Ito regrets, that postwar Japanese historians have "tended to 
reassess pre-war Sinology simply as part of the Japanese government's aggressive poli-
cies" and thus have neglected to give writers like Yamaji the serious consideration they 
deserve. 16 
    Jung-Sun N. Han also acknowledges the diversity of nationalist thought vis-d-vis 
overseas expansion, but finds nonetheless that: 
       [W]hether it took the form of establishing "a new, European-style empire on 
       the edge of Asia," as Foreign Minister Inoue Karou once claimed, or making a 
       pan-Asian strategic aligni-nent among Japan, Korea, and China to carve out Ja-
       pan's Asia free of Western imperial encroachment, as PrinceKonoe Atsumaro 
       advocated, there was a growing consensus that Japanneeded to expand itself 
       onto the Asian continent in order to establish a sovereign andcompetent nation-
       state. In short, the modem Japanese transformation was made of both "nation-
       building" and "empire-building" processes, which weremutually constitutive, 
       sometimes conflicting and sometimes complementing each other." 
Focussing in particular on the well-known theorist of democracy, Yoshino Sakuza 'r_3 
Vff~-iA-, a professor of law at Tokyo Imperial University, Han argues that "the need to 
rationalize the imperial project in the changing international system forced Yoshino to 
redefine Japan's own image of self in accordance with international terms."" What this 
meant in practical terms, for instance, was that he was in favour of Japan's economic 
penetration of China but not in its territorial expansion there, which he knew would 
provoke conflict with the other foreign powers on the ground. To offset Japan's economic 
and industrial weakness relative to the Western powers, according to Han, "Yoshino 
called for a cultural turn in Japan's China policy."" In other words, the Japanese would 
win the Chinese over by emphasizing their intellectual affinities-but not, surprisingly, 
their racial or cultural affinities: "what Yoshino assumed as an intellectual affinity was not 
tradition-bound but a modem invention-it referred to the export of the recent experience 
of the Meiji Restoration to China."" Thus, in his Short History of Chinese Revolution 
(1917), Yoshino described the Chinese revolutionaries as the "spiritual heirs of the Meiji 
Restoration" and "emphatically articulated the ways in which the Japanese 'spirit' of 
modernizing the political system was transmitted to the Chinese, laying the groundwork 
for the Chinese revolutions."" In this way he sought "to make the experience of the Meiji 
Restoration the central paradigm in sustaining the influence of the Japanese Empire."" 
    Ironically in view of the imperialist uses to which he would put it, Yoshino viewed 
the Meiji Restoration as a great liberal democratic event, "the universal expression of the
56 Ibid., p. 226. 
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progressive popular will against oppressive government."" But, as Han points out, by 
presenting the Meiji legacy, including the Constitution and the emperor system, through 
the medium of "liberal discourse," Yoshino hoped to make it "congenial with the domi-
nant imperial norms of international society" and thus ensure the survival of a "new Japan 
                                       1114 at the core ofa liberal mpire. 
    In the thought of writers such as Yamaji and Yoshino, then, we can see some in-
teresting-and paradoxical-early attempts to export or globalize Japanese cultural na-
tionalism by an appeal to some form of pan-Asianism. Although their brave attempts at 
a grand synthesis of these two apparently conflicting ideologies may not have won many 
converts on the Asian mainland (except among Japanese expatriates), within Japan itself 
their ideas became mainstream until 1 945, and even today they still help shape popular 
and nationalist interpretations of Japan's role in Asia-Pacific history.
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